Introduction
Transactions-cost economics defines the role of firms to be that of administering transactions that involve specific assets, especially in the presence of uncertainty (see e.g. Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979; c Grossman and Hart, 1986) . However, in recent years, a new paradigm has "" emerged in competitive strategy that identifies the primary role of firms to be jj that of generating rents from sourcing, creating, replicating, integrating and I commercializing knowledge. The central idea is that rents derive from idiosyncratic knowledge (see e.g. Rumelt, 1987; Winter, 1987; Demsetz, | 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Spender, 1994; Grant, 1996b) . The recent 5 evolution of team-based organizational forms has been largely understood to serve the purpose of improving horizontal knowledge flows within the firm (Aoki, 1988; Adler, 1995) . Similarly, decentralization within firms is understood to be driven by a need to co-locate managerial decision rights with asymmetrically distributed and valuable information (Jensen and Meckling,
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1992), whilst diversification is understood to be motivated, inter alia, by firms' exploitation of stocks of proprietary knowledge (Teece, 1980) . This new paradigm suggests that firms, as institutions, must play an important role in governing the production and commercial utilization of valuable knowledge. The production and commercialization of knowledge implies the use of services of 'research-labor' and the exchange of flows of 'semi-finished' pieces of knowledge that require further elaboration and refinement in order to generate 'finished knowledge' in the form of innovative products or processes. However, these services of research-labor and knowledge-flows must be governed and coordinated in such a way that leakages are avoided. Knowledge is only valuable if it is privately held, and others are excluded from its use. Yet, knowledge is inherently a public good: its possession by one party does not naturally exclude its possession by another party (Arrow, 1962) . Thus, knowledge can only be maintained as a private good by the deliberate exclusionary actions of individuals and institutions (Cheung, 1982) .
It is a widely accepted proposition that markets for knowledge transfer will tend to fail (Arrow 1962) . However, the question of why, and how, firms may do better than markets in protecting knowledge from appropriation remains largely unexplored. Empirical evidence indicates that legal protections that firms can employ against appropriation are relatively ineffectual (Mansfield, 1985; Levin et al., 1987) .
1 Furthermore, legal protections are available to conduct market transactions. However, it is possible that firms are able to deploy mechanisms other than legal protections to defend against appropriation. Therefore, explaining what firms can do to protect knowledge from appropriation-to keep their 'organizational secrets' indeed secret from their rivals-is a very important question from the point of view of the Theory of the Firm. It may also be important in explaining performance differences between firms: only knowledge that is asymmetrically distributed among firms can earn rents. Ytt, knowledge will only be asymmetrically distributed if firms are able to protect the knowledge they generate from appropriation by rivals. The incentives of firms to invest in innovation therefore depend directly on their protective capabilities. Moreover, firms must be able to protect knowledge for sustained periods of rime: firms are costly to institute and maintain (Williamson, 1991) , and the production and exploitation of valuable knowledge may take years to accomplish. In this study I examine three broad classes of mechanisms that firms may use to protect their knowledge from appropriation: (0 rules; (ii) compensation; and (iii) structural isolation. Each of these mechanisms can be deployed by firms in ways that would not be feasible in market-governed transactions. I describe the way in which each of these mechanisms can be used to protect proprietary knowledge; identify some of the constraints on their effectiveness; and describe their costs. In my discussion, I draw on data from a wide variety of sources. An extensive literature search revealed that there is very little in the current business, organizational theory or institutional economics literature on the issue of organizational secrecy. Consequently, I draw on theory and examples from a variety of other fields, including political science, history, sociology and psychology, to inform my discussion. In each case, I illustrate the relevance of this theory and these examples to the world of business firms. I also use interview data, and accounts of specific situations reported in the business press. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some characteristics of knowledge that are relevant to the subsequent discussion. Sections 3-5 describe how rules, compensation schemes and structural isolation can be used by firms to protect their knowledge. Section 6 provides a discussion and concludes the paper.
Knowledge: Some Characteristics
According to Webster's Dictionary, 'knowledge' can be defined as acquaintance with or theoretical or practical understanding of some branch of science, art, learning, or other area involving study, research, or practice and the acquisition of skills. . . . the body of truth, fact, information, principles, or other objects of cognition acquired by mankind.
This definition illustrates two important characteristics of knowledge. First, it is costly: developing knowledge takes time and manpower. Moreover, the acquisition of valuable knowledge is an uncertain process, involving both search and luck (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1987) . Hence, one firm always has incentives to acquire a rival's knowledge if it can reduce its costs by so doing. Second, knowledge is embodied in employees, and in the 'knowledge products' produced by employees such as plans, products, processes and machinery. Much of this knowledge can be transmitted from one firm to another by moving either the knowledge products or the 625 employees themselves. Thus, firms have both the motive for, and the means of, appropriating knowledge from rivals. However, the degree to which knowledge can be appropriated, and the degree to which organizational arrangements are effective in preventing such appropriation, depends on the characteristics of the knowledge itself. These include (i) whether knowledge is codified or tacit; (ii) whether the knowledge is, or can be, possessed by individuals, rather than groups; (iii) whether the knowledge can be legally protected; and (iv) whether the knowledge can or cannot be used effectively by rival firms.
Codified vs. Tacit Knowledge
One factor influencing the transfer of knowledge is whether or not it is codified, or indeed, can be codified. Knowledge may be codified by being written down (e.g. in a plan, contract, client list, instruction manual or code book) or by being embodied in an obvious way in process machinery or a product. For example, a computer or a car can be 'reverse engineered' by a competitor. Codification may facilitate the sharing of knowledge within the firm, and/or allow it to be stored for future reference.' However, codified knowledge may be more readily appropriated by rivals than tacit knowledge, because it does not need inter-personal communication to be effectively transmitted. Tacit knowledge, instead, is not codified, and can only be learned by observation or by doing (Polanyi, 1962) . Therefore, a rival firm would need either entry to a firm or to hire away its employees to acquire tacit knowledge.
Individual vs. Collective Knowledge
A second important consideration is whether valuable knowledge can be possessed entirely by one individual or whether it is a collective good. Collective knowledge falls into two classes. First, collective knowledge may be 'groupware' in the sense that it only creates value when used by a number of individuals at once. For example, shared routines may have value only when used by a specific set of individuals in team production. Automobile production teams, spaceflight crews, musical groups and surgical operating teams are examples of valuable collective knowledge of this type; the value of each individual's output depends on the routines used by other team members. Absent other members and the value of an individual member's output falls. 4 In this type of collective knowledge, an individual may be able to codify the routines used by group members and reveal them to another firm, which can then implement them to organize group work.' However, there may still be unobservable or tacit aspects of such knowledge that will reduce its value as a codified good.
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Second, one individual's knowledge may require other complementary or 'cospecialized' knowledge in order for it to be valuable (Teece, 1986) . A classic example of this is a secret code, where one operator possesses one part of the code and another possesses its complement. Only by having both parts of the code can the secret message be deciphered. Less exotic examples of valuable cospecialized knowledge arise in research and design teams, and multi-stage manufacturing processes.
More generally, valuable knowledge may be more or less diffused throughout a firm. Diffused or shared knowledge is argued to enhance coordination and innovation (Allen et al., 1980; Adler, 1995) . However, not all knowledge may need to be shared throughout the firm for coordination to be efficient (Postrel, 1994) . A firm may also deliberately restrict the internal diffusion of knowledge in order to protect it from leaking across the firm's boundaries. This issue is addressed in more detail in subsequent sections of the paper.
Legally Protectable and Non-protectable Knowledge
Various kinds of knowledge can be protected under the law. First, new products or processes (i.e. 'inventions') can be patented. However, new products or processes must be substantially different from prior products or processes to be eligible for patenting. Consequently, many innovations that are valuable may be non-patentable. Furthermore, patenting involves public revelation of valuable information, and patents are costly to prosecute (Lerner, 1995) . As a result, a firm may elect not to patent a product or process that can provide competitors with information about follow-on products or ' The value of these routines is evidenced by the longevity of the personal makeup of many of these organ izations.
' For example, W Edwards Deming provided codified instructions on organizing group production efficiently to many different firms, frequently producing dramatic increases in productivity (Giber, 1992).
' For example. General Motors installed robotic production systems almost identical to those used by Japanese automobile producers throughout its factories during the 1980s. However, it was unable to reap any productivity improvements from this investment, apparently because it lacked knowledge about the organizational routines required to implement the technology successfully.
processes. Second, a firm can copyright certain documents. Again, copyrighting does not protect knowledge from being released; it merely provides the firm with a replication monopoly for a period of time. In addition, copyright protection is difficult to enforce for particular classes of 'documents' such as databases and software that may be compiled from public sources and/or have numerous derivative uses (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986) . A third, potentially more binding form of legal protection is found in trade secrets laws (Cheung, 1982; Lerner, 1994) . 7 These laws prohibit an employee of a firm from providing any person not employed by the firm with documents or other codified information that pertains to the business of the firm. 8 However, trade secrets laws have some important loopholes. For example, they do not apply to 'inchoate' or non-codified knowledge (Cheung, 1982) . Trade secrets laws are also difficult to prosecute when the originator of the secret is an employee, unless that employee has entered into an explicit contract regarding trade secrets with the employing firm, and when that firm has made good faith efforts to safeguard the secrecy of the knowledge in question (Cheung, 1982; Lerner, 1994) . 9 Therefore, a firm must incur the costs of using at least some protective mechanisms if trade secrets protections are to apply. Furthermore, unlike patents, trade secrets laws do not protect against a rival using 'fair' methods to replicate the knowledge concerned and put it into practice (for details see Seidel and Panich, 1973) . Finally, trade secrets laws are not binding on third parties (Cheung, 1982) ; should a third party unwittingly obtain a secret from someone who has herself feloniously obtained it, that third party cannot be prosecuted, even if they put that secret into practice. 10 In sum, the legal protections available for knowledge tend to ' According to the new federal Uv on trade secrets, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), a trade secret a any information that is 'related to or included in a product that is produced for, or placed in, interstate or foreign commerce'. Where the EEA does not apply (in intra-state commerce), firms must rely on state trade secrets statutes that tend to provide a much narrower definition of what constitutes a trade secret. See Seidel and Panich (1973), Cheung (1982) , Barrett (1991) and Lerner (1994) for details of state trade secrets statutes such as the the Uniform Irade Secrets Act, and Levin (1997) for details of the EEA.
1 Before the EEA (see above), trade secrets were protected only by state statutes. The EEA provides a much broader definition of trade secrets than these statutes, and allows for the imposition of much more significant penalities for infractions-up to $10 million in fines; up to ten years of imprisonment; and broad provisions for property forfeiture.
' A firm cannot * prim daim rights under federal or state trade secrets statutes to all knowledge originated by an employee; for this to obtain, the firm needs to enter into an explicit contract with the employee (see Barrett, 1991 " Indeed, the failure of trade secrets laws to protect against third party appropriation may be one powerful reason for establishing a firm. In a market transaction, if one party has incentives to misappropriate a secret of the other, any third parties who also obtain and use that knowledge are immune from prosecution, provided they were not in overt collusion with the original appropriator. If, however, the two original transacting parties are both within a firm, third parties become direct parties, and so become more liable to prosecution. be narrow in scope, so that a considerable body of knowledge that is valuable to a firm cannot be protected through these avenues.
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Usable vs. Unusable Knowledge Finally, the potential for leakage of knowledge from one firm to another depends on the degree to which that knowledge can be effectively used by competitors. First, a rival's use of a firm's knowledge may be limited by a lack of complementary assets (Teece, 1986) . Second, a competitor's ability to make use of another firm's knowledge may be limited by its 'absorptive capacity' (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) : the competitor may have too few knowledgeable employees to understand exactly what the knowledge content of any information it receives actually is. The more complex the knowledge is, the more difficult it will be for rival firms to put it to use (Winter, 1987) . Third, leaked knowledge may have little value to competitors because of imperfect imitability (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) : it may be very difficult for one firm to replicate perfectly the valuable activities or products of another firm because of causal ambiguity. While the imperfect imitability of a single technology may only be observed ex post, competitors may come to understand over time that certain types of knowledge cannot be successfully appropriated from rivals. Again, knowledge about complex production systems or complex products may be far less valuable to competitors than knowledge about simpler processes or products (Winter, 1987) .
In sum, while there are various aspects of knowledge itself that might make a firm's knowledge more or less appropriable by its rivals, most firms face the problem that at least some of their valuable knowledge can be appropriated (Cheung, 1982) , and that rival firms have incentives to appropriate it. This reality obliges firms to protect their knowledge by employing appropriate institutional mechanisms.
Rules and Knowledge Protection
Firms are legally empowered to impose and enforce rules on their employees that could not be imposed and enforced with equivalent effectiveness on the employees of one party by another party to a market contract (Masten, 11 The imperfections in current intellectual property law can be understood to be the result of history and changes in technology. The Office of Technology Assessment (1986, p. 21) made the following observation: "Seldom is a system (of intellectual propeny protections) a well-conceived and well-designed construct; it it more likely to take shape haphazardly, reflecting the political compromises and historical events that went into its making'.
1988).
12 Imposing and enforcing rules is therefore one obvious mechanism available to firms for protecting their proprietary knowledge. To be effective, however, the observation of rules must be monitored, and enforced through the use of sanctions.
Rules and Monitoring
Restrictive rules can be divided into three classes as follows:
1. Rules that restrict transfer of specified knowledge by specified employees to specified others. 2. Rules that restrict social interaction by specified employees with specified others. 3. Rules that restrict physical access by specified employees into specified areas where specified knowledge is stored.
In each of these cases, firms may be able to either (i) employ rules that would not be permitted at all in market contracting, due to their role as restraints on competition; or (ii) employ more fine-grained and/ or binding rules than would be possible within the context of a market contract.
Rules that restrict transfer of specified information. When valuable, proprietary knowledge is codified, and when it can be identified, a firm may be able to institute a rule forbidding the transfer of that knowledge to anyone but a specified set of employees. The most common type of rule of this kind is one governing the circulation of certain specified documents such as strategic plans, contracts in negotiation, or documents describing products or production processes such as blueprints and computer software. The effectiveness of this rule depends, in part, on the firm's ability to monitor whether documents have been leaked. 13 For example, documents may be numbered or otherwise marked (e.g. with 'Top Secret' stamps, or ultraviolet-sensitive insignia) so that they cannot be transferred in original or duplicate form " Limits on one firm's employees' actions c*n be imposed via contract by another firm. However, it a difficult for one firm to assure thai another will carry out all the actions required to comply with such stipulations, and it is also difficult for one firm to monitor another's compliance with such stipulations. " Market agreements may contain provisions also that documents cannot be circulated freely by parties to the agreement. However, monitoring such agreements may be far more costly in markets, and the costs of sanctioning transgressors may be much higher. See the discussion of trade Secrets laws in Section 2 and the following section on sanctions.
without revealing their origin. Alternatively, documents may be kept in a particular place-that is, archived-and access to them controlled and/or recorded. Oliver Stone, the movie director, uses both these methods to protect knowledge of his movie projects from leaking to outsiders:
Scripts are numbered so that if one is leaked to an outsider, it can be traced . . . Stone keeps his shot list-the daily work schedule-a secret from everyone except his cinematographer. (Schifij 1994, p. 43) Rich and Janos (1994, p. 23 ) describe how documents were protected at Lockheed's 'Skunkworks' plant, where the super-secret Stealth Fighter was planned and built:
Every piece of paper dealing with the [Stealth Fighter] project had to be stamped top secret, indexed in a special security filing system, and locked away . . . They imposed a strictly enforced two-man rule: no engineer or shop worker could be left alone in a room with a blueprint. If one machinist had to go to the toilet, the co-worker had to lock up the blueprint until his colleague returned.
Similar methods are used to protect information stored in computers: passwords, limited access terminals and 'firewall' protections against hackers are all used to restrict access to information and to prevent its theft (Behar, 1997) . However, Behar (1997) suggests that protecting computer-stored information is very problematical, relative to storing information in document form, because computer hackers are able to break most security codes installed by firms.
14 Levin (1997) reports that a committee of Congress investigating theft of trade secrets in the USA surveyed a sample of 205 Fortune 1000 firms. Of these firms, 63% had detected illegal outside use of their computer systems within the previous year. Another study conducted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1996 found that, in a sample of 400 large firms, more than 40% had experienced a recent computer break-in (Behar, 1997) ; some 30% of these break-ins took place despite the presence of security firewall in the companies' computer systems. Behar (1997, p. 58) reports Bruce Schneir, an expert on computer security, as commenting that: The only secure computer is one that is turned off, locked u Outsiders can also find out a firm's computer secretj using devices that can read the contents of computer screens from a distance. These devices, called 'Van Eck' devices, were first developed for political espionage. They are readily available on the commercial market, forcing firms to use security measures not only for protecting cabled computer communications, but also for the locations where computer! processing sensitive information are used. Behar (1997) reports that, in 1992, Chemical Bank found a Vu Eck device at its credit card processing facility. Microwave transmissions of data may also be insecure, without sophisticated encryption. in a safe, and buried 20 feet down in a secret location-and I'm not completely confident of that one either'.
Valuable knowledge may not only be embodied in documents: product prototypes, machines, or materials may also be valuable to competitors. For example, in one biotechnology firm I visitied for this study (which I will call GoneCo here), the use of biological research materials is carefully controlled. Traditionally, biotechnology researchers have exchanged research materials such as cell lines relatively freely; these exchanges serve to speed up the process of discovering their properties and functions. However, in recent years, a number of incidents have arisen in which unpatented cell lines or other materials have been 'poached'. 15 To protect against such eventualities, CloneCo has recently instituted a rule that no research materials may be passed to outside researchers by the firm's scientists without the prior approval of management and the signing of a formal, enforceable contract with the firm by the outside researcher that restricts the terms and conditions under which the research materials concerned can be used and transferred.
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Rules that restrict social interaction. When knowledge is tacit, a rival firm may only be able to acquire valuable knowledge through learning-bydoing. For this to take place would require quite extensive social interaction between a rival's employees and those of the 'target' firm, such as a factory visit, a research collaboration or a long discussion (Grant, 1996a) . By controlling such social interactions, a firm may be able to protect its knowledge base.
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The simplest type of rule is one that forbids social interaction with certain classes of others altogether. For example, an employee may be forbidden to " The most notorious incidence of poaching is the 'KG-1 affair' in which Sidney Prstka, * scientist at Hoffman-La Roche, obtained, without permission, a cell line via a colleague from a researcher at UCLA, and then passed the cell line on, also without permission, to Genentech. As it turned out, the cell line was very valuable for the production of interferon, and Genentech was able to raise a large amount of investment capital based on its 'discovery' of the process (Wade, 1980). Genentech and its parent, Hoffman-La Roche, are currently being sued by the University of California for this misappropriation of the university's property. Theft of biotechnological materials is often difficult to prevent or detect because only very small amounts of a substance are required for replication or analysis.
talk with any employee of a rival firm or their possible intermediaries, such as consultants. A more fine-grained type of rule is to control which specific social interactions may or may not take place. For example, at CloneCo, the firm controls the participation of its scientist-employees in external collaborations with academic scientists. These collaborations are valuable to the firm, allowing it to access the knowledge of external experts (liebeskind et at., 1996; Powell et al., 1996) . However, collaborations inevitably result in leakage of information to outsiders, despite the precision with which contracts are specified. Thus, CloneCo excludes external scientists from research projects that involve highly valuable knowledge about products or processes.
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Other firms that are less cautious may pay a high price. For example, Werth (1995, p. 71) describes how Vertex, a new drug design firm, risked losing control of valuable research findings by collaborating with an outside scientist (Stuart Schreiber of Harvard) on key research:
Boyer [the CEO of Vertex] feared that Schreiber was persistently naive about the need for secrecy . . . 'I'm not concerned that that Stuart will find a compound that will compete with ours,' Boyer said. 'But I am concerned that he'll tell everyone in the world what we're doing.'
Rules governing social interaction also help prevent the leakage of codified knowledge. For example, observing an employee meeting with an outsider in contravention of a corporate rule may be a reliable indicator that information is being leaked by that employee, either physically or verbally.
Rules restricting social interaction may also apply within a firm. Indeed, considered broadly, job definitions and the reporting hierarchy of a firm can serve to restrict certain interactions while promoting others (Liebeskind, 1996) . For example, scientists conducting sensitive research who work within an R&D division may be effectively prevented from talking with employees who work in other divisions simply because the organization structure of the firm does not provide for any interaction between the two divisions. Of course, specific rules may also be used to reinforce these structural boundaries.
Rules that restrict physical access. Finally, a firm may use rules that prevent employees from entering specific locales.
19 For example, employees " This ippean to be i rather leaky mechanism: information from one research project may be essential for the pursuit of another, and scientist! may hare trouble remembering what to say or not to say in scientific conference) or at the laboratory bench. Nonetheless, managers at CloneCo daim that it can control leakage effectively in this way. Zucker tt at. (1996) provide some evidence that early stage scientific research can be protected through exclusion. may be forbidden from visiting the premises of rival firms, or from meeting in certain bars, restaurants or dubs where rivals' employees are known to congregate. This type of rule may provide a more watertight protection against leakage than rules against social interaction per se: presence in a place is more easily monitored than inter-personal contact. One example of a rule of this type concerns individuals who work for corporations involved in classified defense projects. These individuals are frequently forbidden by the Federal Government to travel outside the USA, for fear that they will be kidnapped or suborned. An amusing example of this type of restriction, from the world of espionage, is provided by Sheymov (1993, p. 110) , who describes how KGB employees of overseas embassies were restricted from fraternizing:
In any foreign posting, those [who have access to sensitive information] are forbidden to go into town alone. Nor are they allowed to visit the town with their own wives-a measure to deter defections. The standard joke is that one is allowed to defect only with somebody else's wife.
A firm may also control employees' movements within its own boundaries: specific internal locales, where valuable knowledge is stored, may be ruled 'off limits' to other employees and outsiders. This latter mechanism, which I call 'structural isolation', is discussed in detail in Section 5.
Sanctions
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Portuguese charted routes from Portugal around Africa to India and the Far East; the navigation maps that resulted allowed them to earn monopoly rents from the spice and silk trades. To protect their valuable knowledge, the Portuguese monarches ordered that all details of the trade routes be kept secret:
'It is impossible to get a chart of the voyage,' an Italian agent complained after Cabral's return from India, 'because the King has decreed the death penalty for anyone sending one abroad. ' (Boorstin, 1983, p. 267) Unlike medieval kings, firms cannot punish leakage with death; their powers to punish are limited by the law, and the most severe sanctions they can offer are termination and/or legal sanctions. Termination, however, may be a largely ineffective deterrent to leakage-the equivalent of shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted, even though it may deter future transgressors. Legal sanctions may be somewhat more effective if an employee is party to a 'non-compete clause', which prevents employees from working for competitor firms for a period of time following their departure from a firm, or has signed a contract allocating all her intellectual property to the firm for the period of her employment. In this case, employees can be prosecuted under trade secrets laws. However, the burden of proof remains with the firm, and this burden is not easily satisfied (Cheung, 1982) . For instance, in 1993, General Motors' top-ranked purchasing executive, J. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortura, together with seven other key executives from the purchasing department, abruptly left the firm to take positions at Volkswagen. GM and German authorities subsequently found evidence indicating that Lopez had taken a cache of sensitive documents with him, including plans for a new GM car. Boxes of documents to which Lopez had near-exclusive access when he worked at GM were found in an apartment belonging to one of the other 'defecting' executives, and Lopez himself admitted to shredding documents from GM on Volkswagen's premises. Despite this evidence, three years passed before GM was able to take the case to trial in the USA, after it sought, unsuccessfully, to obtain a criminal trial in Germany. GM's principal problem in pursuing its suit in Germany was that Lopez had not signed a confidentiality agreement with the firm.
Social sanctions may do better than the blunt instruments of termination and legal recourse. A firm can engender social relationships among its employees such that rules are enforced through 'social' controls, rather than through more formal monitoring and sanction mechanisms. In his classic treaty on social control, Ross (1901) describes how the threats of opprobrium and ostracization can serve to enforce adherence to group behavioral norms. Ross argues that people's self-worth, social relationships and even economic livelihood depend on the good opinion of others.
20 Social control, then, operates through the threats of losing self-esteem and access to valued others, imposing significant psychological, social, and economic costs on individuals who transgress established norms. Social control can be engendered by firms through the employment relationship. Employee selection and long-term commitments by the firm to employ, combined with the creation of socially stable workgroups within the firm, reduce the costs and increase the returns to an employee of forming social relationships in the workplace (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Liebeskind and Zenger, 1997) . Employee selection, education and training can also be used to foster the formation of specific social norms within the firm.
For social control to be effective in deterring leakage of knowledge by employees, leakage would need to be both (i) a social taboo [i.e. some act that is universally recognized among employees as something that should not be committed, for fear of the consequences (Freud, 1950) ] and (ii) detectable by fellow employees. I am not aware of any studies that specifically address the role of social control in maintaining organizational secrets in firms or, indeed, any other type of formal organization. However, the fact that some voluntary social organizations (such as the Masons) and religious organizations (such as the Mormons and Opus Dei, an organization of the Catholic Church) are able to keep their inner workings almost completely secret from outsiders suggests that social control is a highly effective method of enforcing norms of secrecy on organizational members in some settings.
21 Some firms, in some circumstances, may be able to replicate these successes.
The Costs of Using Rules to Protect Knowledge
The most obvious cost of using restrictive rules to protect knowledge is the cost of monitoring those rules. The scant evidence that is available indicates that monitoring is very costly. For example, Rich and Janos (1994, pp. 79-80) describe the high personnel costs of security monitoring during the production of the top secret Stealth Fighter:
We were monitored unceasingly. Toward the end of the stealth project I had nearly forty auditors living with me inside our plant, watching every move we made on all security and contract matters ... I had to double my administrative staff just to keep up with all these audits. For better or worse, we were living in a Kafkaesque bureaucracy.
Similarly, Scott (1991, p. 33) Even assuming IBM was able to buy these specially printed envelopes at the bargain basement price of 10 cents each, it was still spending $400,000 a year on envelopes alone. The costs of protecting computer-transmitted information may be very much greater: Behar (1997) reports that US firms spent $6 billion on computer network security in 1996. The IBM example also illustrates that significant cost of monitoring may be attributed to 'overkill'-an excessive use of security rules and monitoring procedures. Overkill is apparently a common feature of security compliance. For example, Scott (1991) reports that Northrop adopted far more stringent security rules for the B-2 project than the Air Force required, using the logic that even if an action violated Northrop's rules, it most probably would not violate those of the Air Force.
A second set of costs associated with using restrictive rules derives from residual leakage. Because knowledge is a public good, once it is leaked to a rival firm, it cannot be restored perfectly to its prior status as a purely proprietary asset. Therefore, the primary objective of any rule-based regime should be prevention of leakage, rather than punishment ex post for enabling leakage; punishment may deter in future periods, but in many cases, this may be too late.
22 Yet, few knowledge systems have 'knowledge production technologies' that can prevent leakage by a short menu of rules. The problem may be most severe in the production of new knowledge (i.e. R&D). This is an uncertain process, and the knowledge possessed by research scientists is frequently so specialized as to preclude effective monitoring by less informed supervisors (Thompson, 1967; Jensen and Meckling, 1992) . For example, it may be very difficult for the management of a biotechnology firm to develop effective rules about which external research collaborations its scientists should, or should not, participate in. Similarly, it may be very difficult to decide which documents should, or should not, be made public (Hicks, 1995) , or which knowledge should, or should not, be shared, and with which individuals. The costs of errors in this regard may be very high: a manager in possession of knowledge whose value she does not comprehend may unwittingly reveal it during joint R&D work, or during an important negotiation, press conference or social event, with costly consequences for the firm. One example from the world of politics of the high costs of unwitting revelation is offered by Andrew (1995, pp. 356-357 In addition to the problem of identifying effective rules, there are legal constraints on the terms and conditions of employment that restrict the menu of rules, monitoring systems and sanctions that firms can adopt, and this can further add to the costs of residual leakage. For one, rules restricting social interaction, or physical access, may be deemed to be invasions of constitutionally guaranteed privacy (Gormley, 1992) . Restrictive rules may also be deemed anti-competitive.
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A third type of costs incurred by restrictive rules is goal distortion, wherein the resources a firm devotes to legitimate monitoring (i.e. monitoring required to enforce legitimate restrictive rules) becomes diverted for other purposes. Recent US history provides a legion of examples where government agencies that were established to conduct legitimate surveillance abused their powers by conducting illicit surveillance (and worse). For instance, Andrew (1995) and Powers (1987) document that in recent times, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency have all been involved in illegal surveillance and other illegal activities made feasible because of their surveillance powers. These events point to the problem of controlling the actions of surveillance organizations, be they in governments or firms. The chief executive officer of a corporation, just like the Executive Branch of the US Government, has a constitutionally provided power to control the actions of any surveillance organization under the firm's legal aegis. Effective control, however, may be elusive, because the illicit surveillance activities of an effective surveillance organization will be, by definition, very difficult to detect. Mui (1995) calls the violation of accepted legal procedures to prosecute alleged but unobservable conspiracies 'witch hunts'. He argues that witch hunts are more likely to occur in regimes where citizens' freedom of expression and rights to information are curtailed, and when citizens' rights to privacy and due process under the law are diminished. All these conditions may prevail in firms where the hand of the law regarding individuals' rights is partially stayed by firms' rights to set and enforce rules governing the actions of their employees (Masten, 1988) . Evidence that witch hunts occur in the corporate world is provided by Swayse's (1993) research on Proctor & Gamble (P&G). In this book, Swayse (1993, pp. 27-31) documents that P&G's security service routinely steps outside acceptable (or even statutorially legal) practices in monitoring the activities of its employees:
Much of the tight control on information stems from fear of competitors finding out too much. There are plenty of companies who would love to find out P&G's plans. . . . But much of it is simple paranoia. One brand group discovered just how paranoid P&G is when they went to lunch at a Cincinnati restaurant and discussed a commercial that was already on the air. Late that day the brand manager got a call from his boss to discuss a 'security violation'. He was scolded from talking about the advertisement at a public restaurant. 'Security people go to restaurants because P&G is convinced that corporate spies sit around to hear our conversations,' he said. They hope that by harassing you enough, you'll comply with the rules.' Some security officers do little besides ride airplanes between Cincinnati, New York and Chicago to make sure that P&G and its advertising agency representatives do not talk shop in flight.
Internal phone calls are monitored too. One former officer recalls how he was interrogated by his bosses because the phone records showed that he had returned a phone call to a Wall Street analyst.. . . Others pegged as troublemakers believe their home and office calls were monitored.
Some officials claimed that security helps managers obtain employees' medical and police records if they want to check out somebody a bit more closely. Indeed, while she was writing a series of articles on P&G for the Wall Street Journal, Swayse was followed, and had her telephone records subpoenaed by the company. 24 Fourth, imposing numerous restrictive rules may be very costly in terms of employee disaffection. For one, withholding information (qua knowledge) within a firm may result in a loss of trust. Information is often essential for instilling confidence and trust (Luhman, 1988; Case, 1995) . In turn, trust may be essential to elicit risk-taking behavior among employees. Loss of trust, then, will restrict the set of behaviors that employees will be willing to take (Luhman, 1988) . Furthermore, evidence from behavioral psychology indicates that the use of monitoring and sanctions to influence behavior may lead to resistance, rather than cooperation, on the part of employees (Strickland, 1958; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1992) . Employees will also respond negatively to monitoring mechanisms that are perceived to constitute excessive invasions of their personal privacy (Bok, 1983; Kupfer, 1987) . Indeed, Swayse (1993, pp. 36-37) Similarly, Caute (1978) documents the effects of the introduction of a 'loyalty oath' during the McCarthy era on the faculty of the University of California. He reports that the University lost 60 scholars as a result of its efforts to legislate loyalty. Of these, 26 were dismissed [for refusing to take the oath], but an additional 37 resigned in protest. Another 47 scholars refused offers of appointments, also in protest of the loyalty oath, illustrating that potential employees may be deterred from working for a firm in the first place, if it is encumbered by numerous restrictive rules or is characterized by a high degree of social control.
Finally, restrictive rules may be very costly in terms of knowledge foregone. Restricting knowledge flows within a firm inhibits innovation and increases coordination costs (Allen tt al., 1980; Allen and Hauptman, 1990; Adler, 1995; Liebeskind, 1996) . First of all, communication between a firm's employees and external experts allows a firm to access knowledge it does not " The situation at P&G, as described by Swayse, b not unlike the conditions obtaining under the 'totalitarian' management regime* of Stalin and Hitler. Indeed, Shorris (1984) argues that many corporation! are essentially totalitarian in nature and suffer the various inefricienries that attend such regimes as a result.
possess itself, or to verify knowledge it does possess, thereby reducing its R&D costs (Teece, 1992; Iiebeskind et al., 1996) . Empirical evidence indicates that sourcing knowledge externally may be critical to firms' survival and success in industries such as electronics and biotechnology (Saxenien, 1994; Powell et al., 1996) . In many other industries, suppliers, buyers or competitors may be sources of valuable ideas for new or improved products (Von Hippel, 1988) . All these sources of valuable knowledge may be choked off inefficiently by the imposition of restrictive rules. Again, Swayse (1993, p. 28) documents such a choking off at P&G:
Technical people are told not to join trade organizations out of fear they'll give away trade secrets. . . . After P&G took over RichardsonVicks, managers were banned from attending trade shows. 'Too much visibility' their new employer declared. When P&G bought Charmin paper mills, it ended workers' long time habit of sharing spare parts and supplies with a neighboring paper plant. . . . They were told never to talk to those people again' said one engineer.
Similarly, restrictions on internal interaction between employees may also choke off innovation and will certainly increase coordination costs (Aoki, 1988; Adler, 1995) . An additional problem is that, when communication is restricted, vital knowledge may not be passed from one generation of employees to the next. As a result, some knowledge of the firm will be lost over time (Kuran, 1993) -One example of this occurred at Rockwell. When the space program began, Rockwell designed a 'space plane' as a competing model for space flight to rocket-launched space modules. When the rocketlaunching model was selected, Rockwell was ordered to destroy its plans, because the federal government feared that otherwise they may fall into unfriendly hands. Two decades later, however, the knowledge Rockwell had gained was needed to assist in designing the space shuttle. However, by this time, most of its knowledge had been lost, as the original engineers on the project had long retired.
2 '
Compensation and Knowledge Protection
Compensation Design A second mechanism available to firms for protecting proprietary knowledge is compensation design. By pooling the rewards of producers and users of knowledge, firms may be able to govern transactions between producers and users more effectively than markets. For example, if knowledge is produced by teams (i.e. each team member is both a producer of knowledge and a user of other member's knowledge), unifying the ownership of that knowledge by forming a firm and rewarding the producers of that knowledge based on the combined product of the knowledge-production team may be more efficient that coordinating the activities of team members using market mechanisms. If each team member owns a share in the total output, they have stronger incentives not to violate the team's knowledge monopoly by double-selling the information, and to monitor the behavior of other team members in regard to leakage, than if they were producing subsets of knowledge and trading them across markets (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987; Kandel and Lazear, 1992) . Similarly, if the value of knowledge can be increased by transferring (trading) it from one individual asset, or set of separately owned assets, to another, unifying the ownership of the knowledge or assets involved may be more efficient that trading that knowledge through markets (Teece, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1986) .
High-powered incentive schemes should also motivate employees not to leak information that is valuable to the firm. It is a widely accepted proposition that, if the compensation structure of employees is perfectly aligned with the value of the firm, the problem of opportunism by employees (however manifested) will be largely resolved. In the usual treatments of compensation design, the problems for a principal are those of eliciting effort or information from an agent. The central result of these models is that employees' compensation should optimally be highly correlated with their own individual output (Ross, 1973) , or to the value of a collective team output if technology or output is not easily separable (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987) . 26 For the purpose of protecting knowledge from appropriation, then, compensation schemes appear at first blush to offer an attractive alternative to rules. For example, because of the difficulties involved in monitoring experts (Thompson, 1967; Jensen and Meckling, 1992) , using compensation rather than rules should reduce residual leakage. Compensation schemes may also reduce the costs of information foregone, relative to rules, because compensation schemes permit self-regulation, which can result in more fine-grained behavior than rules. For example, a research scientist in a * Note that these arguments are not justifications for the existence of firms ptr u; they only seek to explain bow compensation should be designed, given that a firm exists. Cams partita, firms cannot match the high-powered incentive schemes offered by markets; internalnarion inevitably reduces the correlation bctweeu compensation and value (Williamson, 1985) .
biotechnology firm who owns a large equity stake in that firm has incentives both to collaborate with outside experts (which can add value by reducing R&D costs) and not to leak valuable information to those outside experts, at one and the same time.
Despite these benefits, high-powered compensation schemes may not be sufficient to prevent leakage because employees may be able to write covert compensation contracts with other firms. Leaking knowledge to one or more rivals, together with agreeing on a covert compensation contract, may allow an employee to increase her total compensation. This can be illustrated in the following example:
Two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, are locked in a patent race. The outcome of this patent race will be that one firm will garner all the rents to a discovery while the second firm will suffer a net loss equivalent to the costs of entering the race. Let returns to the discovery for each firm be R and the costs of entering the patent race be C, which is the cost of time and effort of its employees in conducting research to obtain the patent. Then, at the end of the patent race, one firm will earn R -C > 0 and the other firm will lose C. Employees of Firm 1 who are paid a share u of its value will therefore earn pU,\ (R -C) if it wins the patent race and 0 if it loses (assuming limited liability), where p is the probability that Firm 1 wins the race. Now, let an employee of Firm 1 be able to write a covert contract such that she will supply Firm 2 with Firm l's knowledge and receive a pay-off. If Firm 2 offers a covert contract that is identical to the employee's contract with Firm 1, the employee's total compensation from the patent race is Sj,]p(R -Q+ s/,^1 -pY.R -C). This return provides the employee with a perfect hedge against failure. If Firm 1 wins the race, she earns s^ipiR -O). If Firm 2 wins the race, she earns J,^(1 -pXR -Q-The probability of her earning nothing is reduced to zero. Thus, the employee gains from leaking knowledge, regardless of how highly powered is her compensation contract with Firm I.
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While this example is highly stylized, it illustrates that a number of contingencies are important in determining whether or not rewards alone can be effective in restricting knowledge leakage to rivals. These include:
1. whether leakage is detectable; 2. whether or not leakage to rivals significantly erodes the value of knowledge of the originating firm; 3. whether a firm's knowledge is codified; 4. whether or not covert contracts can be agreed (be they written or verbal) without detection.
Detection of leakage. The returns to leakage are obviously dependent on the probability of detection and the cost of punishment following such detection. In addition to monitoring and sanction systems, as discussed above in Section 3, a firm can also increase the likelihood of detecting leakage by designing the knowledge structure of the firm so that proprietary knowledge is a collectively, rather than an individually held good. If valuable knowledge is a collective good-that is, no one person knows enough to provide valuable knowledge to an interested party-then leakage of knowledge will require a collective effort. 28 This in turn will increase the probability that one employee involved in leakage will betray the other employees involved, and will also increase the probability that leakage will be detected by other non-leaking employees of the firm. The possibility that these outcomes may occur in turn incurs costs of coordination among employees who seek, collectively, to engage in leakage. These costs include the costs of monitoring the behavior of other co-conspirators to reduce the probability of betrayal or detection, and the costs of imposing sanctions on team members suspected of betrayal.
A well known illustration of the extent of the costs of monitoring co-conspirators is offered by the Mafia. Here, an entire organization is devoted to defying the law. Because the organization's activities involve group production (such as drug smuggling and prostitution), many Mafiosi share knowledge about others' illegal activities. In consequence, a large part of the Mafia's productive capacity is devoted to monitoring members, and to punishing those members who 'fink' to the authorities (Gambetta, 1988) . For example, during the recent 'Clean Hands' campaign in Italy (which was intended, inter alia, to eliminate the influence of the Mafia in Italian politics) the Mafia became obsessed with rooting out potential collaborators, and scores of Mafiosi who were suspected of cooperating with the Italian authorities were killed (Stille, 1995) . Therefore, a firm may be able to structure knowledge ownership internally in such a way that it becomes entirely uneconomical for any group of employees to contemplate leaking knowledge to rivals, because the probability of detection, or the costs of avoiding such detection, are too high relative to the returns to leakage. One example of the creation of separate and incomplete domains of knowledge is offered by Michelin. During the 1960s, Michelin had a monopoly on knowledge relating to the production of high quality steel-belted radial tire manufacturing. In order to preserve this monopoly, manufacturing was divided into two separate processes: steel belt manufacturing, and tire production. Employees were not rotated between these manufacturing processes in a deliberate effort to restrict the number of employees that had knowledge about both processes. As a result, only a handful of very senior managers within Michelin were knowledgeable about the entire manufacturing process. More subordinate individuals within the organization would need to collaborate in order to obtain knowledge valuable to rivals.
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The value of leaked knowledge. In the example given above, the knowledge that is leaked from Firm 1 to Firm 2 is still valuable, because it results in a patent that is owned exclusively by one or the other of the two firms. More commonly, however, leakage can be expected to reduce the value of knowledge, because once leaked, the knowledge is diffused. In the extreme, knowledge may have positive value only when it is uniquely owned, and no leakage has taken place at all. For example, a scientist who publishes a discovery in a professional journal cannot subsequently apply for a patent to that discovery; the discovery has already, through publication, been placed in the public domain and hence cannot be patented. Therefore, in order to protect the value of her knowledge, the scientist should not communicate her discovery to anyone until a patent application has been filed. In other instances, losses from leakage may be less extreme because of constraints on diffusion such as lack of complementary assets (Teece, 1986) , limited absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) or uncertain imitability (lippman and Rumelt, 1982) . The effectiveness of compensation schemes in protecting knowledge therefore depends on the feasibility of diffusion and the associated pay-off structure.
Codified versus non-codified knowledge. If knowledge is not codified, it may be more difficult for any given employee to leak it without moving to another firm herself. The original employer may then be able to employ more high-powered incentives to deter exit than is possible for preventing leakage that does not involve exit. For example, a firm may increase an employee's exit costs by awarding her bonuses that are only paid out after she has worked for a specified time period with the firm. 31 In addition, a firm can write a binding contract that forbids a departing employee from working for rivals for specified periods of time following exit. Both these mechanisms increase an employee's costs of leaving one firm to work for another. Nonetheless, examples of firms losing individual members who possessed valuable knowledge to rival organizations are legion, suggesting that it is hard to write exit-disincentive contracts or enforce non-competition contracts. In a study of 44 innovations in Swedish firms, Zander and Kogut (1995) find that the exit of key employees is a significant determinant of early imitation by rivals. Similarly, Almeida and Kogut (1995) Covert contracts. Finally, the feasibility of writing covert contracts may be reduced if firms are able to oblige their employees to reveal all their economic interests. While I am unaware of any studies that have examined this issue in relation to the employees of commercial firms, many universities and many public institutions such as the Federal Government require such disclosure.
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For instance, at Stanford University, faculty are required to report any investments in firms doing business with Stanford promptly, to avoid conflict of interest (Stanford University, 1994) . Failure to report such interests in a timely and accurate fashion can lead to termination. Similarly, members of the US Congress are required to report sources of both campaign finance and outside income, in an effort to reduce conflicts of interest (Wilson, 1986) .
" One common use of deferred rewards is pension plant, where a firm agrees to 'vat' its pension payments to an employee only after they hare worked for the firm for a number of years. Deferred stock options-so-called 'golden handcuffs'-are also a widespread form of reward scheme designed (httr tlis) to prevent early exit of employees.° The fact that universities-which are non-governmental organizations-can oblige such disclosure from their employees suggests that privacy laws may not be a significant deterrent to requiring disclosure of the personal economic interests of employees. Therefore, firms may require such disclosure.
However, monitoring the outside interests of employees is costly, and evidence indicates that the rules (at least those applying to members of the US Congress) are frequently transgressed.
Psychic Rewards vs. Monetary Compensation
One way a firm might overcome the problem of covert contracting is to supplement monetary compensation with 'psychic income". Employees with preferences for ethical behavior may gain significantly more utility from 'doing the right thing by the firm' than they could ever garner from leaking (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Krameret a/., 1996) . }3 Thus, a firm that is able to communicate its rules regarding knowledge protection in ways that appeal to, and satisfy, these preferences, and thus may be able to do considerably better in terms of protecting its proprietary knowledge than less articulate rivals. Some extreme evidence of the power of psychic rewards in motivating individuals to keep information secret is offered by stories of resistance to interrogation by individuals arrested during Stalin's purges (Volkogonov, 1993) , many of whom were executed when they refused to provide information, or name other 'co-conspirators'.
The Costs of Using Compensation to Protect Knowledge
While high-powered compensation schemes may provide employees with sufficient incentives not to leak information to other firms, these incentives are costly. First of all, if a firm pays its employees a high proportion of its residual surplus, it will have less money available to invest in new knowledge, which may undercut its ability to compete in future periods. This applies particularly to cash payments, because these must be paid out of current cash flows, and so reduce both the firm's retained earnings and its borrowing capability. Firms with large numbers of employee stock options outstanding may also be obliged to operate in a fiscally conservative manner, to ensure that the future value of these options is not eroded by the firm's financial policies. A firm will therefore need to consider carefully the offsetting costs and " Obviously, it a not desirable to select individuals who have a strong preference to keep secrets. Such an individual may gain more by keeping secrets from the firm than by keeping them on the Grin's behalf. The literature suggests that many spies have such preferences (see e.g. Boyle, 1979) . " Leadership matters here. A CEO or other corporate leader who is able to articulate clearly the need for knowledge protection in ethical terms may do much to inspire employees to behave in the interests of the firm. For a discussion of 'inspirational leadership' see Bennis (1993) .
benefits of using high-powered compensation schemes as a substitute for rules.
A second cost of using monetary compensation schemes is that firm growth may be constrained in order to avoid diluting employee incentives (Williamson, 1985) . As firm size increases, it may become more difficult for managers to detect which employees possess critical knowledge, resulting in over-payment of some employees and under-payment of others. This misallocation of surplus may then drive more qualified employees away from the firm (Zenger, 1992) . To avoid such problems, a firm may need to remain small to ensure contractual efficiency.
Depending on psychic rewards may also be costly. For one, appealing to employees' ethical preferences may constrain the firm from asking those employees to behave unethically in other domains. Similar considerations apply to preferences for loyalty. Indeed, Geyelin (1995) attributed a recent spate of leaks, whistle-blowing and theft of proprietary information among major US corporations to these firms' declining loyalty to their employees. Thus, in forming an unwritten 'psychological contract' with employees to reward them in terms of psychic income, a firm cannot then fail to pay its dues without experiencing those negative consequences that it sought to prevent.
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Psychic rewards may also be offset by significant psychic costs: keeping secrets from friends and family is a psychological and a social burden (Kuran, 1993) . As one employee on the secret B-2 project commented:
For those of us working on the B-2 program . . . the high level of security caused problems that most people can't even imagine. First of all, you couldn't tell anyone outside the program what you were doing ... so responses to questions became very difficult. You don't want to lie to your wife, children, parents and friends . . . Travelling . . . was especially difficult. We couldn't tell our spouses where we were going. This . . . caused some serious doubts, especially for wives, that were hard to overcome. (Scott, 1991, pp. 30-31) Psychic rewards will also result in residual leakage. In particular, firms are not the only organizations to which an employee may own allegiance at any single point of time. Unlike tribal societies, where a single set of social relationships constitute an individual's entire social milieu, in modern society, individuals simultaneously belong to a number of different organizations and social groups such as professional societies, religious organizations, political parties, non-profits, friendship networks and families. It may be difficult for a firm to portray its goals in such a manner as to satisfy employees' preferences for ethical behavior when compared with these other organizations to which that employee also belongs. Consequently, an employee's ethical allegiance to a firm may be secondary to her ethical allegiance to other organizations; if or when such allegiances conflict, the firm's interests may be overruled. As a result, a manager may share valuable information with outsiders that belong to a social organization to which that manager owes ethical allegiance, even though this is unethical in relation to the interests of the firm.
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Another cause of residual leakage associated with psychic rewards is employee selection errors. Selecting individuals with a capacity to keep secrets is an uncertain science (Shils, 1956) , and an individual may feign a preference for ethical behavior for unethical ends. Moreover, even the most careful selection and socialization processes may be unable to prevent betrayal (Hawthorn, 1988) . The most notorious example of duplicitous behavior and betrayal is offered by the British spy and traitor, Kim Philby. Although in truth a dedicated Communist and a senior officer of Soviet Intelligence (the KGB), Philby worked for many years as a senior official in MI5, the British counter-intelligence agency, with devastating consequences for the operations of both MI5 and its US partner, the Central Intelligence Agency (Seale and McConville, 1973; Boyle, 1979) . Seale and McConville (p. 218) comment that Philby: appeared the very personification of integrity. He seemed to embody the very British virtues of low-keyed, understated moral excellence, and this image . . . did him sterling service. Boyle (1979, p. 450 ) attributes Philby's success in deceiving his British colleagues to the pervasive belief in the British intelligence hierarchy that everyone was working for the same psychic reward-serving King and Country. This belief was founded on the traditional public school convention of mutual trust obtaining between colleagues who shared the same privileged social backgrounds . . . That a communist conspiracy could have so atrophied the normal impulses of patriotism that men in positions of responsibility would betray their country's secrets to the Soviet Union out of conviction seemed quite incredible.
In addition to the costs of betrayal, which result from selecting the wrong employees, a firm must also consider the costs of rejecting the right employees in the process of determining character. For example, Scott (1991) reports that Northrop rejected 10-12 applicants for every person hired to work on the B-2 Bomber, for security reasons. As a result, the company experienced real difficulties in staffing some of the key technical positions on the project. 
Structural Isolation and Knowledge Protection

Structural Isolation
A third mechanism that can be used by firms to protect knowledge is structural isolation: specific organizational subunits can be organized in such a way that access to them by other employees, or by outsiders, is very limited, if not impossible. In this way, the subunit becomes an 'organizational archive' where valuable organizational knowledge-be it codified or tacit-is stored and to which access is restricted. Structural isolation, then, may offer less ambiguous and more easily enforced restrictions on the actions of employees and others than either rules or compensation schemes.
One means of achieving such structural isolation is geographical separation. A firm can mandate that some of its production activities (i.e. knowledge production activities) be carried out in places that might not be optimal, were those activities being carried out by an independent firm, but which may be optimal given unified ownership. 38 For example, when Lockheed was p Additional evidence on this count is provided by firms' attempts to test job applicants' honesty in order to reduce theft. Until recently, many firms subjected prospective employees who would be handling large quantities of goods or cash to a lie-detector test, to reduce the probability of hiring thieves. Evidently, these tests resulted in so many rejections of honest candidates, relative to the number of dishonest candidates they were able to identify, that they were banned by Congress in 1988 as being unfair infringements of job applicants' rights (Colin, 1990). " In the standard transactions-cost treatment of the theory of the firm, it aprtximtm locations that are considered to create a holding up problem (see eg. Klein a ml., 1978). The argument here b the obverse: where there are economic incentives to co-locate activities (due to spillover benefits and other factors such as transportation costs and hiring advantages), a firm can use its powers of fiat to isolate knowledge production activities so that its value is greater than it would be otherwise. The value of isolation to the firm may be higher than to an independent knowledge producer because the firm is the user of its own knowledge and thus does not need to search for buyers or coordinate activities across legal boundaries. The firm can also specialize its activities internally so that knowledge production benefits from isolation while other production activities do not lose from it.
developing the Stealth Fighter, the flight test center was established far from prying eyes in the middle of the Nevada desert:
The F117-A [the Stealth Fighter] was the nation's best kept secret. . . . The Pentagon located us in one of the most desolate spots in north America . . . part of the Nellis Air Force Base, 140 miles from Las \fegas, an uninhabited area. . . . Only the Lord knows how many other secret government projects were tucked away in that huge test range, the size of Switzerland. (Rich and Janos, 1994, p. 92) Similarly, one highly successful software firm maintains its frontier research facility in a remote area of Oregon. However, such extreme forms of isolation may not be necessary to achieve effective knowledge protection: organizations can also use secured perimeters to prevent employees and/or outsiders from gaining access to areas where knowledge is generated, used or stored. For example, an agribusiness firm (which I will call AgriCo here) where I conducted interviews for this study operates a large commodity-trading business. On any given day, AgriCo buys and sells commodity futures contracts worth many millions of dollars. Were its trading positions revealed to outsiders, it could suffer enormous financial losses. 39 To protect this information, AgriCo organizes all its trading activities, and stores all its trading records, within a single, large room. Almost no-one apart from the trading staff is permitted to enter this room, and the windows of this room are protected to prevent anyone from looking in from neighboring buildings. Similarly, at CloneCo (the biotechnology firm discussed in an earlier example) discovery research activities are protected by a system of locked laboratories. Each research scientist has a card key that allows them access only to those laboratories where they are directly involved in research. Leakage to outsiders can also be prevented by establishing secure perimeters. For example, Electronic Data Services' facility in Piano, Texas, where the firm stores large amounts of confidential data, is surrounded by an impenetrable fence; entrances are guarded, and exiting cars are searched routinely. This firm, then, has reproduced the type of 'security architecture' commonly found in prisons and military bases.
Of course, knowledge protection may not be the only reaion for isolating; escape from the influence of (he parent firm may also be a reason. For example, IBM located the product development efforts for the (then revolutionary) penonal computer in Florida, far from its main RAD center, in order to protect it from the influence of activities by the mainframe computer division (which was threatened by this new product), and from control by IBM's cumbersome corporate bureaucracy.
The Costs of Using Structural Isolation to Protect Knowledge
As in the cases of rules and compensation schemes, structural isolation is costly. First of all, geographical isolation is expensive. Placing laboratories or other production facilities in remote locations increases the costs of transporting people, goods and services within the firm. Also, geographical isolation may make it more difficult for a firm to attract employees: remote locations may be unattractive places to live, and dual career constraints may be binding in such settings.
Second, building secure rooms, plants or zones is expensive, as are guard personnel. These costs may be higher for secure locations that are not remote; geographical isolation provides a level of security that may need to be compensated for by other means in less remote locations. For example, in an urban area it may be more necessary to provide a secure perimeter of land around a building, or build a higher and more secure perimeter wall.
A third type of costs incurred by structural isolation is increases in coordination costs. When people cannot meet face-to-face, coordinating activities becomes more difficult, increasing the likelihood of delays and inefficient outcomes (Adler, 1995) . The extent of these costs, however, will depend on the production technology of the firm. In the case of AgriCo's trading room discussed above, very little may be lost by isolating trading activities: the details of AgriCo's trading activities are not germane to its other businesses. For instance, it is important that AgriCo's trading division obtain sufficient raw material to supply its processing plants year-round. However, the manager of the processing division does not need to know the details of the daily commodity trades to run her plants efficiently. Instead, in the case of CloneCo, detailed knowledge of the research being conducted in one laboratory may be essential for the efficient conduct of research in another. In response to this reality, the firm attempts to establish individualized access rules (via its card key system) for different employeescientists.
Fourth, as in the case of rules, structural isolation will result in knowledge transfer losses: structural isolation restricts knowledge flows both within the firm and across its boundaries in ways that can dampen innovation and increase the R&D and other costs of the firm.
Finally, as in the case of surveillance organizations, structural isolation can result in goal distortion in organizational subunits or even in the entire organization. As Shorris (1984, p. 245) observes, maintaining a climate of secrecy through structural isolation can have the costly consequences of producing behavior that is unconditioned by the scrutiny of outsiders, or is isolated from the influence of widely held social norms:
Morality and secrecy cannot exist together; without the test of publicity, as John Rawls describes it, no one can truly know whether the justification for his acts can be understood by rational men as meeting ethical standards common to the society, the simple Golden Rule, or the more demanding categorical imperative. Without the test of publicity, men may delude themselves into thinking that their ultimate goals justify their actions, even though they would hardly wish for deceit or other forms of violence to become generalized in society.
Indeed, Swayse (1993, p. 5) attributes the misuse of power she documents at Proctor & Gamble partly to the fact that the firm's top managers are located in Cincinnati, where their thinking and behavior are unconditioned by interacting with top managers from other large firms:
'Its such an insular corporation' said one longtime manager. 'If it had offices on Park Avenue instead of Cincinnati, it wouldn't be that way. But 'we're in the hinterlands, and consumed by our own importance.'
Discussion
This study has addressed the question of how firms might be able to protect knowledge from appropriation more effectively than market contracting. Three broad classes of organizational mechanisms available to firms for protecting knowledge have been discussed: rules, compensation schemes and structural isolation. I have described (i) the ways in which each of these mechanisms can be used to protect knowledge; (ii) some of the constraints on their effectiveness; and (iii) their direct and indirect costs. The central conclusion of my discussion is that keeping organizational secrets is both difficult and costly.
In the first place, the effectiveness of each of the three types of protective mechanism is limited. Furthermore, it is more than likely that the 'knowledge technology' of any given firm will be poorly understood by those seeking to design mechanisms for its protection. It is difficult, if not impossible, for managers in many firms to identify exactly what knowledge it is that the firm possesses that creates value. Therefore, it is more than likely that any given set of mechanisms that are adopted will result in either over-protection or under-protection. Second, the costs of protective mechanisms, both direct and indirect, are considerable. Consequently, strong pressures exist for firms to economize with regard to the protective mechanisms they adopt and to the scope of their protection efforts.
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In my discussion here, for the sake of both clarity and brevity, I have treated the three mechanisms as being discrete. However, they may in fact be more effective when used in combination than when used separately. For example, a rule may be better enforced through rewarding its adherence (i.e. through using a rule-contingent compensation scheme) than by monitoring its observance and applying sanctions to transgressors. Similarly, structural isolation may be more effective when used in combination with rules and sanctions. And so forth. A detailed treatment of this issue is not possible within the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the complementary nature of protective mechanisms further complicates the economizing calculus manager's face.
In addition, I have generally taken the approach here that knowledge technology is exogenous. The more likely situation is that managers have at least some control over the knowledge technology of the firm. For example, a firm's management may elect that knowledge be specialized within the firm by manipulating job designs. This will make knowledge appropriation more difficult, if the result of specialization is that valuable knowledge becomes collectively owned within the firm. A compensating cost, however, may be incurred in the form of higher coordination costs, because shared knowledge eases coordination in some circumstances (Postrel, 1994; Adler, 1995) . Firms may also choose whether or not to codify certain elements of organizational knowledge. If knowledge is codified, it is less costly to diffuse within the firm, and also has protection under trade secrets law. 41 However, codified knowledge is more easily appropriated, and therefore may require more protection than tacit knowledge. Thus, in many instances, managers must jointly select both knowledge technology and protective mechanisms. 42 This complicates the economizing calculus yet further.
A third important element in manager's economizing calculus is the choice " This economizing problem b closely relued to thai analyzed by Field (1989) . He examines the coses and benefit! of common ownership, and argues chat consideration of 'exclusion costs'-costs incurred in excluding others from access to a privately owned resource-may mandate common ownership, even if other transactions-costs considerations favor private ownership. Hence, he argues that resources should only be privatized if transactions-costs benefits outweigh exclusion costs.
" Trade secrets law does not apply to 'inchoate' knowledge (Cheung, 1982) , and therefore is not applicable to roost tacit knowledge.
" Cheung (1982) points out chat an inventor may need to choose between a patent-which is a defined right, and therefore not secret-and a crade secret-which a not defined, but is secret. The choices facing firms are similar in character, chough of a different order. That a, firms may choose between legally protectable knowledge (which is codified) and not legally procectable knowledge (which is tacit, but may be less appropriable in certain circumstances).
between adopting protective mechanisms that operate at the boundary of the firm (i.e. protecting knowledge against appropriation by outsiders directly) and those that operate within the firm (i.e. protecting knowledge against appropriation by certain subsets of employees, with the intent that this will protect against appropriation by those employees that intermingle more frequently with outsiders). One is reminded here of the design of castles which have both outer walls, designed to exclude unwanted outsiders, and inner walls or 'keeps' to separate some insiders (the garrison) from other insiders (see Figure I) . 43 Some castles may have a more secure outer wall and a less well-defended keep; others may have a less secure outer wall and a stronger keep; and some may be very highly fortified in both regards. Because both outer walls and keep walls are costly, protection should be sufficient, but not excessive.
Equivalently, in a firm, the more perimeter protections it has in place, the more it will be able to exclude outsiders. In some industries, however, it may be undesirable to overly restrict knowledge-trading relationships with outsiders-even outsiders who can potentially appropriate valuable knowledge-because these same outsiders may possess knowledge that is highly valuable to the firm, and which would be costly or even impossible for the firm to replicate. For instance, it may be essential for an automobile manufacturer to share detailed design information with component suppliers, and vice versa, to reduce costs, increase quality and cut down on model development time (Hayes and Gark, 1988 ). Yet, such exchanges increase the likelihood that the 'core secrets' of each firm may be appropriated by the other. For example, an automobile manufacturer may appropriate component designs from one supplier and give them to another in an effort to obtain cheaper inputs. 44 Knowledge-trading may also be essential in hightechnology and emerging industries. For example, in the computer-chip industry, the fast-moving technological frontier may make it inefficient for any single firm to fully internalize chip design (Teece, 1990; Saxenien, 1994 ). Yet, outsourcing chip design increases the risk that a manufacturer's own proprietary technology will be leaked to its competitors unless it is strictly protected. In biotechnology, research scientists at firms routinely collaborate with scientists at universities and elsewhere to develop new products and processes (Powell et ai., 1995; liebeskind et a/., 1996) . Such collaborations allow firms to access the expertise of outside scientists, economizing on their " Indeed, the castle analogy emerges frequently in descriptions of (ccretive organizations. " These dangers can be protected against by equity cross-holdings, which align parties' incentives and/or provide hostages for the exchange (Williamson, 1983; Pisano, 1990 R&D costs and accessing otherwise unavailable know-how. However, they also increase the probability that outsiders may appropriate valuable, proprietary knowledge (Teece, 1986) . In all these instances, firms may be able to protect their most valuable knowledge only by keeping certain pieces of knowledge secret from those employees who are involved in external collaborations. Otherwise, the risk of either intentional or unwitting leakage is increased. Thus, firms with relatively low 'outer walls', in the form of having few restraints on interactions 656 between many of their employees and outsiders, might be expected to have high 'inner walls', in the form of strong formal restraints on sharing certain subsets of knowledge within the firm. Again, GoneCo provides an example of this protective organizational architecture. The firm engages in both product discovery research and the large-scale production of biologically engineered pharmaceuticals; both of these activities earn the firm substantial rents from its proprietary knowledge. The two production stages, however, are technologically discreet, and only the product discovery research of the firm benefits from external collaborations. Consequently, the large-scale production activities of the firm are kept secret from non-production employees.
In other industries, a firm may be able to survive and succeed with a more autarkic knowledge regime. For example, in firms where suppliers provide only commodity inputs, the returns to exchanging proprietary knowledge with suppliers may be close to zero. These firms, then, will maintain high outer walls and so inner walls-at least in relation to input-related activities-may be avoided altogether. Firms that are not in research-intensive or innovative industries may also have little to gain, and much to lose, from exchanging knowledge with suppliers or competitors. However, it would be incautious to conclude that the problem of managing knowledge collaborations is not widespread. For instance, manufacturing firms are increasingly outsourcing functions that previously were performed in-house, in order to reduce their final production costs. Outsourcing enables buyer firms to capture the economies of scale and specialized skills of supplier firms. Even though buyer firms can protect their most valuable knowledge by selecting which activities to outsource (Argyres, 1995) , some degree of knowledge-sharing with suppliers will be necessary to ensure coordination (Adler, 1995) . This knowledge-sharing will then increase a firm's exposure to knowledge appropriation risks (Teece, 1986) . As a result, competitive pressures to cut production costs may come into direct conflict with competitive pressures to innovate, due to appropriation concerns. 45 The fourth, and final, complicating element in managers' calculus must be to decide how to differentiate knowledge among the hierarchical layers of the firm: inner walls will tend to be both horizontal-separating the knowledge sets of the firm's different activities from one another-and vertical-separating the knowledge sets of workers lower down in the hierarchy from those of workers higher up. Thus, 'keeps' may be constructed both within given units of an organization-resulting in horizontal secrecy-and within given levels of an organization-resulting in vertical secrecy. The discussion in this paper has focused on horizontal secrecy both between a firm and its competitors, and within the firm. However, vertical secrecy is also important, as well as costly. For instance, the keeping of secrets between employees and supervisors undermines trust and cooperation (Luhman, 1988; Case, 1995) . Vertical secrecy is also closely related to horizontal secrecy: if the knowledge sets of some organizational units are kept secret from others, as illustrated by AgriCo and CloneCo, coordination can only be achieved through hierarchical control (rather than by cooperation between subunits). Thus, ironically, horizontal secrecy at one level can only be maintained effectively if secrets are shared at a higher level in the organization. However, protective mechanisms may be more effective within the upper echelons of a firm's hierarchy for a number of reasons. Firstly, because the number of managers decreases with job seniority, peer monitoring will be strengthened (Kandel and Lazear, 1992) . Smaller numbers may also enable more efficient group incentive contracts to be written for senior managers (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987) , intensifying incentives for peer monitoring. Observability may also be improved: upper echelon managers tend to have been with the organization for longer periods of time than lower level managers, so their characters and propensities are better known to other organizational members (McCleod and Malcomsen, 1988) . Indeed, maintaining secrecy may be one reason for the commonly observed phenomenon of firms hiring managers only into the lowest levels of their organizations (Doeringer and Piore, 1971 ).
Keeping organizational secrets not only poses thorny economizing problems for managers: it also impinges on larger questions of social welfare. The received wisdom suggests that only strong property rights will provide firms with sufficient incentives to invest in innovation. Therefore, the fact that firms can advantageously employ organizational arrangements that secure and enforce their property rights to valuable knowledge is understood to be socially beneficial. However, as Swayse's (1993) evidence on Proctor & Gamble points out, the need for secrecy may lead some firms into taking actions that represent serious infringements of the civil rights of their employees. Whether or not such infringements are voluntary is not the only issue of concern; any democratic society should also be concerned, if a significant proportion of its members spend a significant proportion of their time in organizations that imitate, in their very essence, some of the worst characteristics of totalitarian regimes. As Shils (1956, p. 221) observes: 'the maintenance of a functionally necessary secrecy can never be a completely 658 harmonious part of the system of publicity and privacy [that is] essential to a free society'. Furthermore, to the degree that firms (or other organizations) privatize information, the collective knowledge of society is diminished (Kuran, 1993) . The current consensus is that the future industrial state, at least in the developed world, will be based on knowledge-workers, not machine operators. The issue of how firms protect their proprietary knowledge is therefore important not only from a theoretical point of view, but also from a practical point of view. This paper represents only a small first step towards answering this question. I hope, however, that it will serve to stimulate more research on this important and interesting topic.
